4. Metadiscursive Negation, Evidential Points of View and Ethos in Argentine Political Discourse

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1. Introduction

As is widely known, Ducrot (1984) has defined three types of negation: descriptive, polemic and metalinguistic. The descriptive type is regarded as a delocutionary derivative of the polemic type and is said to represent a certain state of affairs which happens to be negative. By contrast, the polemic negation always implies that there exist two antagonistic viewpoints that, within the framework of the theory of polyphony, must be attributed to different discursive beings: enunciators E₁ and E₂. The former is held responsible for the underlying positive point of view while the latter comprises of an objection to the former and represents the point of view to which locutor L adheres. According to Ducrot, polemic negation functions as an assertive representation of a given situation, and it always has a diminishing or decreasing effect (i.e., its interpretation always implies less than) and assumes the presuppositions of the underlying positive utterance.

As opposed to polemic negation, Ducrot depicts metalinguistic negation as a type of negation that contradicts the semantic elements that are comprised within a given utterance that is aimed at being rejected. In this sense, this negation type does not oppose the points of view of two enunciators; rather it has in its scope a different locutor who uttered its positive counterpart. According to the French linguist, it is exactly within the framework of this refusal to an antagonistic locutor that this negation type retains a series of distinctive features. Firstly, this type can bring about ‘a majoring or augmentative effect [of the argumentative force] instead of its normal diminishing or weakening effect’ (1984, p. 217) [translation]. In Ducrot’s view, ‘one can say “Peter isn’t intelligent, he’s brilliant”’, only as a response to another locutor who...
has effectively qualified Peter as intelligent’ (1984, p. 217) [translation]. Secondly, this negation type may – though it is not necessarily a compulsory feature – reject the presuppositions assumed to be the case in the prior positive utterance. Thus, if in (1) the negative utterance only affects the explicit semantic content (i.e., the presupposition that Peter used to smoke remains unaltered), (2) shows a different scenario as is seen in the rectifying utterance following it. In this case, the negative utterance precisely contradicts the presupposition.

1. No, Peter hasn’t quit smoking. He keeps smoking as usual.
2. No, Peter hasn’t quit smoking. In fact, he has never smoked in his life.

To sum up, according to Ducrot, the distinctive feature of this negation type is the fact that it requires a prior enunciation coming from another locutor whose words locutor L considers improper either because they presented an erroneous point of view or because in their utterance, they expressed a presupposition or a certain degree that cannot be accepted, or even ‘because there is something that, due to the mode of expression, may be considered inadequate (such as an element of speech independent of the content, a word which might be considered as ‘out of place’, too colloquial or too distant, a pronunciation or grammar mistake): all these aspects of speech can be rejected by means of a syntactically negative statement’ (Ducrot, 2001, p. 30). [translation]

However, as I discussed in previous papers (Garcia Negroni, 2009, 2017), a reply in a dialogue is not a necessary condition for metalinguistic negation to appear. In fact, this is only the case in its metalinguistic use, properly speaking, in which the negative utterance objects to the use of a given word or a group of words uttered by the interlocutor in light of a syntactic or morphological or social rule that is put to light in the utterance that follows – the one which introduces the rectification. However, the scenario will not necessarily be the same when it comes to what I refer to as a metadiscursive use of metalinguistic negation or, to be brief, metadiscursive negation. As I will argue, this novel type of negation characteristically rejects a quotative discourse frame – a discourse frame related to others’ discourse which is dialogically evoked in the very same negative enunciation to favour a particular subjective positioning or stance. In other words, metadiscursive negation always conveys – I will posit – an evidential quotative meaning.
Most often approached from referential or cognitive perspectives, evidentiality is usually understood as the semantic domain marking the existence of the source of information in the utterance and specifying what type of source—whether direct or indirect—it involves (Aikhenvald, 2004). The source is said to be direct when the knowledge at stake has been acquired by means of a perception arising from one of the speaker’s senses, and is said to be indirect when such knowledge derives from an inference or from a quotation of somebody else’s discourse (Anderson, 1986; Willet, 1988).

Depending on whether it is direct or indirect, some researchers that hold a ‘broad’ conception of evidentiality posit that the source implies different degrees of reliability, which in turn impact on the speaker’s epistemic attitude towards the message conveyed (Chafe, 1986; RAE, 2009). This relation of inclusion in which one of the terms is understood within the scope of the other is not, however, the only position regarding the relationships that can be established between evidentiality and modality. Indeed, as indicated in the bibliography on the subject (Dendale & Tasmowski, 2001), other authors claim that the relationship is one of disjunction or one of overlap. In the case of disjunction, evidentiality and epistemic modality are conceived as independent categories (De Haan, 1999; Aikhenvald, 2004; Cornillie, 2007, among others), given that—as stated—a constant biunivocal correlation cannot always be established between the type of evidentiality and the degree of epistemic commitment. In the case of overlap, although it is admitted that evidentiality and modality constitute independent categories, the existence of a convergence between the two is insisted upon when it comes to inferential evidentiality (Van der Auwera & Plungian, 1998).

Languages vary in terms of the manifestation of evidentiality. Some, such as Tuyuca or Quechua, have different morphemes that specify whether the speaker was a direct witness to the events they are narrating, whether they inferred them or whether they heard about them from a third person. Others, like Spanish, do not compulsorily grammaticalise evidential meanings, but instead have resources that allow the deployment, in certain specific contexts, of ‘evidential strategies’ (Aikhenvald, 2004).

As previously stated, in this paper, I will focus on the analysis of the evidential meaning of metadiscursive negation in Spanish that, like certain syntactic structures, certain adverbial constructions, some discourse markers, certain uses of verb tenses, etc., can convey this type
of meaning’. However, with a view to accounting for such meaning, I will drift from many of the assumptions upon which most studies on evidentiality rest. In fact, on the research paths paved by the theories of polyphony (Ducrot, 1984, 2001), dialogism (Bakhtin, 1981, 1982) and argumentative semantics (Carel, 2011; Carel & Ducrot, 2005; Ducrot, 2004), the dialogic approach to argumentation and polyphony (Caldiz, 2019; García Negroni, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2021; García Negroni & Hall, 2020, 2022; García Negroni & Libenson, 2020a, 2020b, 2020c, 2021; Zucchi, 2020), within which this study is framed, advocates a non-truth-value and non-referential characterisation of meaning (i.e., there is no meaning component that can actually be considered purely objective). Furthermore, this perspective drifts from the principle of the uniqueness of an intentional subject in discourse (i.e., the subjective points of view posed in a given utterance cannot necessarily be attributed to the same discursive being) while also focusing on the functioning of signs in the language system and in discourse.

I will delve into what I have described as quotative evidential points of view (García Negroni, 2018, 2019, 2021) and into how such viewpoints are displayed in instances of metadiscursive negation. All the cases analysed here belong to a corpus collected from a series of speeches delivered by different Argentine political figures: Juan Domingo Perón (three times President of Argentina: 1946–1952, 1952–1955 and 1973–1974), Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (twice President of Argentina: 2007–2011 and 2011–2015) and Julio Cobos (Vice President of Argentina from 2007 to 2011, during Cristina Kirchner’s first administration). I will seek to attain a two-fold aim. First, I will bring to light the fact that, in these cases, negative enunciation is presented as emerging from and responding to a discourse frame related to other voices –which are dialogically evoked by the enunciation itself. I will then seek to show that in dialogic response to such discourse frame, a given subjective responsive positioning arises along with a given ethos of the locuteur (Ducrot, 1984; Amossy, 1999). Associated with different scenes (Maingueneau, 1999, 2002) typical of political enunciation and moulded in light of the different addressees at stake, the variety of ethos identified in the analysis will be as follows: the ethos of confrontation and discredit; the pedagogical one; the defensive ethos of someone who cares for its own public image; the one showing a condition of symmetry; and the cautious, fearful one facing an extreme situation.

The present work will be organised as follows. In section § 2., I will discuss the theoretical and methodological foundations of the dialogic approach to argumentation and polyphony (§ 2.1.). Within
this framework, I propose an approximation to the concept of evidential meaning. More specifically, I explore the dynamics of evidential points of view and how these contribute to sense-making in discourse and the dialogic architecture of (inter)subjectivity (§ 2.2.). In this light, I characterise the quotative discourse frame that metadiscursive negation urges the interpreter to identify and retrieve as its cause (§ 2.3.). In the following sections, I will focus on the quotative evidential points of view materialised in metadiscursive negation, and the identification of the different ethos arising from political enunciation (§ 3.). Finally, I will draw some concluding remarks on this concern (§ 4.).

2. The dialogic approach to argumentation and polyphony

2.1. Theoretical and methodological foundations

Deeply rooted in Ducrot’s theory of polyphony (1984) and the theory of argumentative semantics (Anscombre & Ducrot, 1983; Anscombre, 1995; Ducrot, 2004; Carel & Ducrot, 2005), the dialogic approach to argumentation and polyphony (hereafter referred to as DAAP), adheres to the principle that the sense of a given utterance must be understood as the description that the very same utterance makes of the enunciation from which it emerged (Ducrot, 1984). In this sense, DAAP recognises the existence of four types of semantic instruction to account for the meaning of an utterance, namely: illocutionary, argumentative, polyphonic and causal (Ducrot, 1984). These last ones, concerning speech characterisation according to ‘cause’, explain the difference in meaning between a declarative utterance such as Peter is very intelligent and an exclamative one as in Peter is so intelligent! According to Ducrot, in declarative utterances, enunciation appears ‘as if it were the result of a choice, that is to say, as the result of the decision to provide certain information about an object in particular’ (1984, p. 186) [translation]. In the exclamation, however, enunciation is presented as triggered by ‘the representation of such object: it is Peter’s intelligence itself that seems to have forced the enunciation Peter is so intelligent!’ (1984, p. 186) [translation]. Following this line of thought, DAAP expands on the notion of causal instructions and characterises them from a dialogical perspective. DAAP proposes that every utterance displays as part of its meaning an image of the dialogic ‘cause’ that motivated its occurrence in discourse (García Negroni, 2019, 2021; García Negroni & Libenson, 2020a, 2021). It is precisely to that image – which I will call a discourse frame – that enunciation dialogically and argumentatively responds with a particular stance or subjective positioning (Bakhtin,
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1981, 1982). In other words, the subjective stances reflected and imprinted in the utterance are to be seen as dialogic responses to a particular discourse frame that each enunciation brings forth.

In accordance with the principles of argumentative semantics (Carel, 2011; Carel & Ducrot, 2005), DAAP’s perspective affirms that the discourse frame, i.e., the image that the utterance provides of its ‘cause’, should be described in terms of argumentative chains. It should be remembered here that, according to Carel & Ducrot (2005), the argumentative sequences that display the meaning of an expression or an utterance are composed by two segments articulated through either a normative or a transgressive relation. In the first case, the segments of the chain are connected by means of the prototypical conclusive connector therefore (abbr. THF); in the second case, the two segments are articulated by means of the prototypical concessive connector however (abbr. HW).

Another essential methodological distinction that DAAP takes from Ducrot (1984, 2001) is the distinction that refers to the existence of two different discursive subjects which should not, by any means, be mistaken for the speaking subject: locutor L and locutor λ. Locutor L is the discursive character that, within the sense of the utterance itself, is held responsible for the enunciation at stake. In turn, locutor λ is the being to whom all first-person indexicals are assigned and about whom something is said in the utterance. Nonetheless, DAAP departs from Ducrot’s characterisation of enunciative polyphony in three main aspects: it does not conceive the locutor L as a theatrical metteur en scène who—deliberately and consciously—puts a range of enunciators on stage. Furthermore, DAAP does not insist on maintaining that the enunciator is the source of the semantic content presented in any given utterance, or that L would necessarily take different stances when dealing with diverse enunciators. With a view to avoiding any psychological bias derived from such characterisations and aiming to account for all the semantic perspectives rooted in discourse, DAAP embraces the concept of point of view (hereafter PoV) to account for the semantic values imprinted in the utterance. To add to this, it also advocates that all dialogic features (Bakhtin, 1981, 1982) of sense-making be added to the polyphonic and argumentative depiction of the concept of sense referred to above. In other words, when it comes to sense, all the features related to the engagement of any utterance within the discourse chain, along with the subsequent subjective positioning of response to as well as of anticipation of other discourses, should be considered. In light of these claims, DAAP delves into the different subjective stances
presented within argumentative sequences in discourse. Such sequences always occur as dialogic responses regardless of the speaker’s rhetorical or strategic intentions (García Negroni, 2021; García Negroni & Hall, 2022; García Negroni & Libenson, 2020a, 2021).

In view of this, by articulating principles rooted in the theories of polyphony and argumentative semantics with those of dialogism, DAAP aims to account for all polyphonic and argumentative features of sense from a dialogic perspective and formalise all dialogic relations within a polyphonic and argumentative framework. It is precisely from this viewpoint that DAAP advocates that the characterisation of the PoVs, staging the dialogic relations that a given utterance establishes with the previous and subsequent utterances within the argumentative sequence should be included in the semantic description. Among these PoVs, the central focus of the following section will be evidential PoVs.

2.2. DAAP and evidential PoV

From a DAAP perspective, a PoV encoding an evidential meaning involves a set of dialogic-argumentative instructions (García Negroni, 2019, 2021). Such instructions call for the identification of the ‘cause’ of the enunciation within an evidential discourse frame; a frame that has motivated the enunciation in which such PoV emerges. In other words, whether materialised in certain syntactic structures, driven by certain verb tenses or by certain discourse markers, evidential PoVs systematically display an image of the enunciation in which they are expressed as caused by a specific discourse frame (hereafter referred to as DF) which the interpreter must identify and retrieve to access the sense of the utterance at stake. Shown but not uttered, such DF is constituted by argumentative sequences referring to perceptions or acts of saying that are normatively (i.e., in THF) or transgressively (i.e., in HW) articulated with different types of epistemic statements about λ with respect to them. In other words, the dialogic argumentative instructions embedded in evidential PoVs display the enunciation as one motivated by argumentative sequences referring to perceptions verifying it;

[I have been a perceptive witness to X THF I (λ) can assert X]

as arising from a conjectural DF;

[I can see/ It is said/ it is known Y THF I (λ) can infer X]

or as a result of a quotative DF in which a series of different relations are established between λ and the quoted or evoked discourses
[They say/They said X \(HW\ I (\lambda)\) cannot confirm X]
[They say/They said X \(THF\ I (\lambda)\) think that X is possible]
[You said/They said X \(HW\ I (\lambda)\) have realised that it is not X]
[They say/They may say X \(HW\ I (\lambda)\) don’t think X is true]

among other possible instances. In all these cases, in light of the different types of DF giving rise to the enunciation, a given subjective, responsive positioning is conveyed and must be interpreted as the indicator of the dialogic response to such DF. Therefore, if the evidential PoV is direct, the subjective stance that emerges in response will involve a strong commitment to the words uttered. Instead, if it is indirect, enunciation will eventually indicate precaution, detachment, concession, reproach or even refusal according to the evoked DF to which the enunciation replies.

### Figure 4.1. Direct and indirect evidential PoVs, evoked DF and subjective positioning of response.
Otherwise stated, the analysis of evidential meaning proposed by DAAP does not adhere either to the category of the speaker as the source of sense or as the idea that information is encoded in discourse. Nor does it consider the speaker the source or the empirical origin of the information supposedly conveyed in discourse, as is usually stated in studies conducted about evidentiality (refer to, among other authors, Willet, 1988; Anderson, 1986; Aikhenvald, 2004; Bermúdez, 2006, 2016; Cornillie, 2007; Rodríguez Ramalle, 2008, 2014). Within the DAAP framework, what is central is to account for the way in which the evidential PoVs displayed in an utterance contribute to evince the dialogic, argumentative and polyphonic ‘causes’ that the utterance offers of its own enunciation. In other words, the DFs – for which evidential PoVs urge identification – account for the reason why the enunciation, in which such PoVs are presented, entails a series of dialogic and argumentative features.

In light of the notions discussed above, I will now focus my analysis on instances of metadiscursive negation. As I will try to prove, in these cases, the negative enunciation urges the interpreter to identify and retrieve as its ‘cause’ a quotative DF.

2.3. Metadiscursive negation and quotative DF
Unlike the metalinguistic use, properly speaking, of negation (Ducrot, 1984), the metadiscursive type does not reject the interlocutor’s previous utterance but a DF that must be retrieved as the argumentative representation of the ‘cause’ of that negative enunciation. Therefore, it is precisely this DF, which is related to external voices to be recovered from the ‘discursive memory’ (Courtine, 1981) and which are considered inappropriate or incorrect, that the enunciation responds to with a vigorous rejecting positioning. Thus, for instance, in (3), the refusal at stake (cf. In fact, there are no new labels to depict our doctrine or our ideology. It is not by chanting ‘I’d give my life for Perón’ that we’ll honour our country, our homeland) is not a reply to a previous utterance of a real flesh-and-bone interlocutor. It involves the representation of a dialogically evoked discourse (Bakhtin, 1981, 1982) embedded in the very same negative discrediting enunciation. In this example, it is the discourse of the revolutionary Peronist youth movement that is being discredited:

3. No hay nuevos rótulos que califiquen nuestra doctrina ni a nuestra ideología. Somos lo que las veinte verdades peronistas dicen. No es gritando
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la vida por Perón que se hace Patria, sino manteniendo el credo por el cual luchamos.


In fact, there are no new labels to depict our doctrine or our ideology. We are what the twenty Peronist principles state. It is not by chanting ‘I’d give my life for Perón’ that we’ll honour our country, our homeland but by abiding by the doctrine we are struggling for.


In short, as the materialisation of a quotative evidential PoV, metadiscursive negation is endowed with semantic instructions which call for the retrieval of a given DF – a DF related to others’ discourse which is dialogically evoked in the very same negative enunciation – which is shown as the main cause that has given way to the refusal (L’s particular subjective positioning or stance) expressed in the enunciation. In the following schema, I represent the DF between brackets, the subjective positioning in italics and the link between the DF triggering the enunciation and the subjective stance of response by means of a dialogic connector, HENCE:

[They say X HW I (λ) don’t think X is true]  
HENCE  
L’s refutative (and rectifying) enunciation

So then, in the case of (3), the evidential PoV embedded in the negative utterance prompts the interpreter to identify the following DFs as a constitutive element of sense in the utterance at stake:

[They say X (Peronism is the historical label it can change into Socialism) HW I (λ) don’t think X is true]  
[They say X (chanting ‘I’d give my life for Perón’ honouring our country, our homeland) HW I (λ) don’t think X is true]

It should be noted that, against Perón’s will, the ultimate aim of the revolutionary Peronist youth movement was to transform Peronism into socialism and, what is more, die for it. That is why in (3), variable X (the discourse evoked in the DF) is expressed by means of the argumentative sequences <Peronism is the historical label it can change into
Socialism> and <chanting ‘I’d give my life for Perón’ THF honouring our country, our homeland>7.

Thus, it is this type of DF that accounts for L’s subjective stance of rejection and rectification.

[as what they say is wrong/ illegitimate/inappropriate to me (λ)],

I (L) strongly reject it and, in turn, I (L) suggest the argumentative sequence which I consider suitable for the situation at stake.

To put it briefly, as metadiscursive negation materialises quotative evidential PoVs, the negative enunciation always urges the interpreter to retrieve the DF – shown by the enunciation– which is linked to voices considered erroneous or inappropriate and which must necessarily be interdiscursively recovered. In view of such DF, a certain subjective stance of response arises, along with the advent of a given ethos in the enunciative scene (Maingueneau, 1999, 2002). In the following section I will exemplify and analyse the different types of ethos that emerge from the enunciation of metadiscursive negations extracted from speeches delivered by contemporary Argentine politicians.

3. Metadiscursive negations, political discourse and ethos

3.1. Metadiscursive negation and ethos of confrontation and discredit

Shown but not uttered, the source of the evoked discourse in the DF may turn out to be ‘more or less’ distant, or ‘more or less’ identifiable in the discursive memory. In (3), paraphrase (3a) makes it clear who is to be held responsible for the origin of the discredited discourse by means of an evidential marker–in this case a reduced adverbial clause–of the type as (the + an) Z + verb of saying (Anscombe, 2011).

3. a. In fact, there are no new labels to depict our doctrine or our ideology, as the revolutionary Peronist youth movement claims/ as Montoneros think. We are what the twenty Peronist principles state. It is not by chanting ‘I’d give my life for Perón’ that we’ll honour our country, our homeland, as they insist, but by abiding by the doctrine we are struggling for.

This is the scenario that gives rise to the emergence of the indirect, negative addressee in political discourse8, along with the rise of a given L’s ethos (Ducrot, 1984; Amossy, 1999; Maingueneau, 1999, 2002). L, holding the subjective position of a political leader, appears to be endowed with the suitable qualities to discredit and reject a controversial
act of saying. To put it simply, retrieving the sense of an excerpt like (3) involves identifying in it – by means of the metadiscursive negative utterances – the quotative evidential PoV evoking a DF related to external voices strongly rejected by L.

In scenes of strong confrontation, in which L discredits and undermines the indirect antagonistic addressee’s voice (García Negroni, 2016), the enunciations involving instances of metadiscursive negation do not simply show the emergence of an opposed discourse within L’s own discourse. In light of their occurrence, generally followed (less frequently preceded) by a rectifying utterance, metadiscursive negative utterances will also introduce the PoV to which L will adhere. In (3), the rectifying utterances following the converse sequences of those rejected evoke the following argumentative sequences: \(<\text{Peronism THF twenty Peronist principles}>\), \(<\text{abiding by the Peronist doctrine THF honouring our country, our homeland}>\), which, in L’s view, correspond to the depiction of the situation at stake. Thus, (3)’s overall structure can be outlined as follows:

[They (the revolutionary Peronist youth movement) say X (Peronism is the historical label HW it can change into Socialism / chanting ‘I’d give my life for Perón’ THF honouring our country, our homeland) \(\text{HW I (λ) don’t think X is true}\)]

**HENCE**

**L’s refutative enunciation** (Peronism is the historical label THF NEG. change it into Socialism / chanting ‘I’d give my life for Perón’ HW NEG. honouring our country, our homeland)

**L’s rectification** (Peronism THF twenty Peronist principles / abiding by the Peronist doctrine THF honouring our country, our homeland)

In this sense, in (3) a scene of controversy emerges and in it the indirect antagonistic addressee’s discourse is discredited and refuted by a contentious L, whose words are presented as the only legitimate utterances. Yet other instances might appear. In fact, the quotative evidential PoV – embedded in instances of metadiscursive negation – may give rise to other scenes, and eventually other ethos.

### 3.2. Metadiscursive negation and pedagogical ethos

Though also related to previous discourses, the DF that the negative enunciation replies to may also evoke other’s voices. Therefore, let us consider (4):

4. Apelo una vez más a mis hermanas de género, nosotras ciudadanas de dos mundos, como digo yo, siempre en el mundo de lo privado, para el
cual fuimos educadas, la familia, la protección, los hijos, y en el mundo de lo público, al cual hemos decidido acceder para trabajar, para representar o para dirigir, pero siempre con un pie en un mundo y con un pie en el otro, nos da una visión, no solamente de lo grande que es lo público sino de lo pequeño, del detalle que es la familia, lo privado. Por eso vemos cosas que ellos no ven, por eso podemos distinguir y percibir no porque seamos mejores sino porque tenemos ese mundo dual que debemos compartir y articular.

(Fragmento del discurso de Cristina Kirchner, 14/8/07. Disponible en: http://www.impulsobaires.com.ar)

I appeal to my fellow women. As I always say, we are citizens of two worlds. We were brought up to live in the private world of family matters, protection and kids. But we were also educated to deal with the public sphere. And we have decided to face it to have a job, to represent others or even to run organisations. Yet we are always split into two worlds, which gives us the chance to appreciate how large the public universe is and how small and delicate family and private life is. That’s why we can see details men can’t, that’s why we can distinguish and perceive veiled aspects of life, not because we are better but because we have this two-world view that we must share and put together.

(This is an excerpt taken from Cristina Kirchner’s speech delivered on 14/8/07. Available at: http://www.impulsobaires.com.ar)

In light of the relationship with the figure of the positive addressee (in (4) the female collective: my fellow women, we are citizens of two worlds), the type of ethos that emerges from this excerpt can be depicted as a didactic or pedagogical ethos and the instances of metadiscursive negation embedded in it are not extrinsic to such emergence. In fact, along with other discursive procedures which are typical of expository/explanatory discourses (definitions, examples, causative relations, to name a few), (4)’s metadiscursive negation gives rise to a teaching scene (Maizels, 2010) in which an asymmetric relationship is established between L—in the position of an expert entitled to refer to a given state of things—and its addressees, discursively constructed as disciples who must be provided with certain knowledge. As can be stated, this type of scene gives rise to an intelligible representation of ‘the real’, thus the instances of metadiscursive negation do not aim to reject a political adversary’s saying, as is the case in (3). The DF, which must be retrieved as the ‘cause’ of the refutative enunciation and to which the enunciation dialogically replies, –due to the position of power granted by knowledge–now alludes to indefinite voices which, as part of the interdiscursive
arena, are held responsible for certain social representations that must be discarded.

[They (indefinite voices/certain feminist groups) say X (women can distinguish and perceive veiled aspects of life THF they are better than men) HW I (λ) don’t think X is true]

Again, paraphrase (4a) containing an evidential marker of the type as (the + an) Z + verb of saying enables the interpreter to retrieve the collective voice to which the origin of the rejected discourse is assigned:

4. a. We can see details men can’t, but not because we are better, as certain collectives of women claim.

As opposed to λ’s own discursive positioning, these representations are rejected and corrected by L by means of the following rectifying utterance, which introduces the ‘true/real’ sense that L–from a position of power derived from knowledge–reveals to the addressees involved:

[As I (λ) consider that what is sometimes said /certain feminist groups state is incorrect],

I (L) discard it and, in turn, I (L) suggest the argumentative sequences corresponding to the situation at stake.

In (4), the new sense is expressed by means of the following sequence: women have a two-world view THF they can distinguish and perceive veiled aspects of life. Thus, (4)’s overall structure can be outlined as follows:

[They (indefinite voices/certain feminist groups) say X (broader understanding of the state of things THF being better than men) HW I (λ) don’t think X is true]

HENCE

L’s refutative enunciation (broader understanding of the state of things HW NSG, being better than men)

L’s rectification (women’s participation in two worlds THF broader understanding of the state of things)

3.3. Metadiscursive negation and self-defensive ethos

However, if metadiscursive negation conveys a quotative evidential PoV, the other different voices evoked by the DF to which the enunciation replies may be either previous or prefigured. As Bakhtin states (1981, 1982), any utterance is a link in the discourse chain. As such, it involves not only a response to previous utterances but also, in an
anticipatory manner, a reply to those utterances that might eventually follow it. This can be seen in (5):

5. ¡Qué nos pasa! Y acá quiero hablarnos –y no es una cuestión de clase, por favor, soy peronista– a nosotros mismos, a esta clase media tan volátil, a esta clase media como yo, universitaria, a la clase media que muchas veces no entiende y cree que, separándose de los laburantes, de los morochos, le va a ir mejor. Le pasó a todos, es como el sino de las grandes frustraciones en la historia argentina.


What’s going on to us! I’d like to speak to you Argentines —and, please, it is not a question of class; I’m Peronist— I’d like to address our own collective, such a volatile middle class I belong to. We belong to a social class that has been able to reach higher education and we sometimes think that life will become rosier for us if we drift apart from the dark-skinned working classes. This has happened to us all. This has involved one of the greatest frustrations in Argentine history.

(This is an excerpt taken from Cristina Kirchner’s speech delivered on 14/10/2010. Available at http://www.lacampora.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/CFK-Discurso-acto-de-la-Juventud-Peronista-en-el-Luna-Park-14-09-20101.pdf)

At times introduced by a negative expression of the type this doesn’t mean/doesn’t imply (Sp. no es que + polemic subjunctive, RAE, 2009), or at times introduced by negative forms presented in explanatory clauses as seen in (5) (please, it is not a question of class), the quotative evidential PoV encoded in this type of negation leads the interpreter to identify a DF related to voices of likelihood as the dialogic ‘cause’ of the enunciation:

[They may say X (CFK speaking to the middle class THF CFK being classist) HW I (λ) don’t think X is true]

This teaching scene, in which the refutative enunciation appears to have been caused by a DF related to possible objections to the speech at stake, paves the way for a self-defensive, suspicious ethos of someone who is concerned about its own public image. While on the alert for any possible misinterpretations, we can see the rise of the discursive image of a person seeking to control sense, thus cancelling any possible
criticism or negative judgement. Let us focus on the adverbial locution *por favor* (Eng., *please*), which can function as a rejection marker that either discards previous discourse as far-fetched or inadmissible (Santos Río, 2003) or, as in the case of (5), disregards what the interlocutor or somebody else might possibly say. Once rejected by means of the converse argumentation (Carel & Ducrot, 2005), the argumentative sequence is rectified on the grounds of a different argumentation. Thus, `<CFK speaking to the middle class THF CFK being classist>` is corrected by `<CFK being Peronist THF CFK Neg. being classist>`

As I (λ) know that what somebody might say is wrong],
I (L) fully reject it and, in turn, I (L) suggest the argumentative sequence that corresponds to the situation at stake.

Thus, (5) should be outlined as follows:

[They may say X (CFK speaking to the middle class THF CFK being classist) HW I (λ) don’t think X is true]

HENCE

L’s refutative enunciation (CFK speaking to the middle class HW CFK Neg. being classist)
and L’s rectification (CFK being Peronist THF CFK Neg. being classist)

### 3.4. Metadiscursive negation and symmetric ethos

In certain cases, the possible critical utterances being cancelled in an anticipatory manner might be attributed to the adversary or negative addressee:

[They’ll say X HW I (λ) don’t think X is true]

As can be seen in the example below, the self-defense ethos merges with the confronting ethos:

6. Compañeros y compañeras: quisiera poder contarles de la mejor manera, lo que siento en este momento. Verlos a ustedes me hace recordar parte de la historia de mi propia vida y también la de nuestro país. Déjenme decirles que siento una sana envidia por todos ustedes. Pero no por lo que seguramente alguno mañana va a decir “claro, querría tener 20 años, por eso se hace la nena”. No, qué va. ¿Sabén por qué les tengo envidia? Porque cuando yo fui joven como ustedes, cuando junto a miles y millones de argentinos apostábamos a un país diferente, no tuvimos la suerte que tienen ustedes hoy de vivir en un país con todas las libertades.

(Fragmento del discurso de la Cristina Kirchner, 14/12/2010.
http://www.casarosada.gob.ar/informacion/archivo/22619-bl.png)
My dearest fellow citizens, I’d like to describe my feeling to you as clearly as possible. When I see you, I can remember my own personal life as well as the history of our own country. Let me tell you that I can feel healthy envious of you now. But not because of what some will probably say tomorrow: “I understand, she’d like to be a twenty-year-old, that’s why, she pretends to be younger than she really is.” By no means. Do you know why I feel envious? Because when I was young like you, we used to struggle for a different country—we were thousands, millions of us in those days—but unfortunately, we were not as lucky as you are now. Today you can enjoy a country that ensures freedoms of all kinds.

(Excerpt taken from Cristina Kirchner’s speech delivered on 14/12/2010. Available at http://www.casarosada.gob.ar/informacion/archivo/22619-blank-77976707)

Several features in the excerpt above contribute to the emergence in (6) of a conversational scene of convergence in which L addresses its supporters and followers (positive addressees) as if L were a friend of theirs speaking about its most private, intimate feelings; in this case, memories of political militancy in a youth movement. In this intimate scene, we can also see an explanatory clause (but not because of what some will probably say tomorrow) containing a quotative evidential PoV embedded in the negation. This example shows that this PoV leads us to interpret the refutative enunciation containing it as one resulting from a DF related to possible voices assigned to the adversary.

However, the negative enunciation in (6) does not just behave as an anticipatory reply which gives rise to a figure confronting an enemy whose voice is being discredited in a mocking tone. By stating some will probably say tomorrow, L alludes to a ‘media corporation’, which has been one of the favourite targets in former president Kirchner’s speeches, particularly in the wake of the conflict with the farming sector in 2008. In light of this scenario, L refers to some knowledge (i.e., the troubled relationship between the former president and the press) that is shared with its positive addressees. This common ground gives way to a strong bond of support between L and its positive addressees, who bring that event to their minds as part of the ‘shared memory’ in Kirchnerist discourse. In other words, the segment but not because of what some will probably say tomorrow acts as a memory of previous discourses, while the sense of those utterances is being updated in the present act of enunciation. This gives rise to a bond of mutual, intersubjective understanding between L and its positive addressees. Therefore, since the addressees are constructed as members of the same collective

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who share certain knowledge about what is being alluded to\textsuperscript{12}, the symbolic roles L assigns to its addressees and to itself reinforce a scene of a relaxed, friendly talk of mutual understanding. This raises an inherent symmetric ethos.

\[
\text{[as I (\(\lambda\)) know –and we all know– that what some (members of the media corporation) will say tomorrow is a lie],} \\
\text{I deny (L) it and, in turn, I suggest (L) the argumentative sequence corresponding to the situation at stake.}
\]

Negation in (6) can be outlined as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{[Some (the media corporation) will say X (NEG. being young THF being envious of their young age) HW I (\(\lambda\)) don’t think X is true]} \\
\text{HENCE} \\
\text{L’s refutative enunciation (CFK NEG. being young HW NEG. CFK being envious of their young age)} \\
\text{and L’s rectification (CFK’s young age without freedom THF CFK’s positive envy of young age with freedoms of all kinds)}
\end{align*}
\]

3.5. Metadiscursive negation and cautious, fearful ethos

A last example will be analysed to illustrate the relationship that can be established between metadiscursive negation and the category of ethos. In this case, we can see negative utterances embedded with evidential PoVs urging the interpreter to identify DF related to critical voices or instructions of what should be done or said. Such is the case of the following excerpt taken from former vice-president Cobos in the so-called ‘non-positive vote’ event, which takes place within the framework of the heated confrontation between the national government and the farming industry over the export tariffs imposed on agricultural goods. It should be noted that this excerpt comes from the final speech of the parliamentary debate on the 125 Bill in which, as President of the Senate Chamber, J. Cobos had to cast a vote to resolve the deadlock. However, his position opposed that of the national government to which he belonged.

7. Yo sé que me cabe una responsabilidad histórica en esto, hay quienes desde lo político dicen que tengo que acompañar por la institucionalidad, por el riesgo que esto implica. Mi corazón dice otra cosa y no creo que esto sea el motivo para poner en riesgo el país, la gobernabilidad, la paz social. Quiero seguir siendo el vicepresidente de todos los argentinos, el compañero de fórmula hasta el 2011 con la actual presidenta de los argentinos. Vuelvo a decir que es uno de los momentos más difíciles de mi vida. No persigo ningún interés. Estoy diciendo, o expresando, tratando de expresarlo,
I know I am responsible for a historic decision. On the one hand, some people state I should vote in favour to ensure institutionality, as otherwise might be risky. On the other hand, my heart says something different and I don’t think this might eventually put institutions, governance or social peace at risk. I wish to continue holding this position as Argentina’s vice-president and Argentine President’s running mate until 2011. Once again, this is one of the most difficult moments I have been through in my life. I don’t advocate any vested interests. What I mean to say is that my decision is driven by my convictions and feelings. This is very difficult, surely. I think that Argentina’s president will understand us all, she will understand me. As I don’t think that if this law is passed, it will imply a solution to the conflict. History will judge me. I don’t know which judgements will be made. I hope this can be understood. I am a family man, like all of you. The only difference is that I bear institutional responsibility over this issue. I can’t vote in favour and this doesn’t mean that I’m a betrayer. I stick to my convictions. Thus, I ask Argentina’s president to take this golden opportunity to submit a new bill considering all the aspects dealt with and all the contributions given in this parliamentary debate, whether by parliamentary members or by people from other social sectors. History will judge me. I apologise if I am mistaken. My vote, my vote is not positive. My vote is against the law.

(Excerpt taken from J. Cobos’ speech delivered on 17/7/2008. Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PDHWP9_XWhE)
man, like all of you) in a difficult situation (the only difference is that I bear institutional responsibility over this issue): either casting a vote in light of his feelings or being accused of betrayal due to his vote because it differs from the ideas supported by the government he is a member of. This excerpt contains several instances of polemic negation (I don’t think this might eventually put institutions, governance or social peace at risk, I don’t think that if this law is passed, it will imply a solution to the conflict) giving rise to dynamic PoVs following the same argumentative orientation (Anscombre, 1990; Roitman, 2009). Such orientation ensures argumentative coherence in the text and is made explicit by some instances of metadiscursive negation such as I don’t advocate any vested interests, I can’t vote in favour and this doesn’t mean that I’m a betrayer, my vote is not positive, which clearly reject DFs related to previous or prefigured sayings regarding any vice-president’s duties and responsibilities. Therefore, such sayings would condemn his dissenting vote. In view of such voices, attributed to the government of which I is a member as the vice-president (cf. some people state I should vote in favour to ensure institutionality; I wish to continue holding this position as Argentina’s vice-president):

\[
\text{[You (government } \lambda \text{ is a member of) say } X \text{ (against the law THF advocating vested interests)} \quad \text{HW I (} \lambda \text{) don’t think } X \text{ is true]}
\]

\[
\text{[You (government } \lambda \text{ is a member of) say } X \text{ (negative vote THF betrayal)} \quad \text{HW I (} \lambda \text{) don’t think } X \text{ is true]}
\]

\[
\text{[You (government } \lambda \text{ is a member of) say } X \text{ (being a member of the government THF voting in favour)} \quad \text{HW I (} \lambda \text{) don’t think } X \text{ is true]}
\]

the enunciation replies in disagreement. Nonetheless, it is not until it comes to an end that a quasi-confessional scene showing a cautious, fearful ethos of someone who is concerned and tentative about its words and just acts in line with its heart, its convictions and feelings that the rectification presented by its own PoV emerges: my vote is against the bill.

[as following my convictions (} \lambda \text{) what is said (by the government) is false],

I (L) reject it and, in turn, I (L) suggest the argumentative sequence corresponding to the situation at stake.

The instances of metadiscursive negation should be outlined as follows:

\[
\text{[You say } X \text{ (against the law THF advocating vested interests)} \quad \text{HW I (} \lambda \text{) don’t think } X \text{ is true]}
\]

HENCE

L’s refutative enunciation (against the law HW neg., advocating vested interests)
4. Concluding remarks

As has been seen above, DAAP’s conception of sense opposes the view that states that linguistic meaning is constituted by informative or cognitive aspects. In view of this conception, DAAP rejects the hypothesis that the study of language implies evaluating propositions in terms of truth values or analysing information content in light of a speaker’s underlying intention. In fact, framed within the ground-breaking theories of polyphony, argumentation and dialogism, DAAP drifts from any type of perspective considering that the semantic value of an utterance results from an intentional subject’s willingness. Thus, this approach does not focus on the mental activity of a real, intentional subject who would eventually let us know how they acquired the information content embedded in the utterance they assert. Rather, the main interest of this approach lies in the depiction any utterance makes of its own enunciation. In light of these fundamentals, this study has sought to contribute to a dialogic, polyphonic and argumentative depiction of the evidential meaning of metadiscursive negation.

In the analysis of this particular issue, it is held that meaning lies in the identification and retrieval of a DF which, shown by the enunciation, gives rise to a given argumentative depiction of other – previous or prefigured – voices. The DF that gives rise to this enunciation, and in which the evidential PoV is expressed through a metadiscursive negation, is constituted, depending on each case by argumentative chains like the following:

[They say/ They will say/ They may say/ You / Some say X HW I (λ) don’t think X is true]

Given that λ (the individual L was and is beyond the enunciation) does not agree on X, L (the discourse being who is held responsible for the enunciation) rejects and cancels such saying, which is dialogically
evoked in the negative enunciation and then introduces its own rectifying PoV:

[as what they say/ they will say/ they may say/ you say/ some say is unreasonable/illegitimate/inappropriate to me (λ)],

I (L) reject it/ discard it/ cancel it/ deny it and, in turn, I (L) suggest the argumentative sequence corresponding to the situation at stake.

Regarded as the depiction any utterance makes of its own enunciation, the sense of an utterance displays a figure of L that emerges from the dialogic relations established by the utterance as a link in the discourse chain. Thus, L is not in fact an entity that is external, extrinsic to language functioning (i.e., the speaker); rather, it is an internal, language-intrinsic figure that responds in a dialogical way to a DF upon which enunciation is founded. In view of what has hopefully been revealed in this study, it can be held that it is this dialogic stance that gives rise to the emergence of different ethos in political discourse in the specific case of metadiscursive negation.

**Endnotes**


2. In French théorie de l’énonciation, there is not only that which is said, the utterance (Fr. le dit), but also the fact of saying it, the enunciation (Fr. le dire) that reflects itself in the structure of the utterance. In terms of Ducrot (1984), the enunciation is ‘the event, the fact constituted by the appearance of an utterance’. Therefore, to describe the meaning of an utterance is no other thing than to describe its enunciation.

3. From DAAP’s view, stance does not refer to the epistemological positioning of the speaking subject but to the positioning which is manifested, within enunciation, as a dialogic-argumentative response towards a discourse frame that unchains it (García Negroni, 2021; García Negroni & Libenson, 2020a, 2021) The present dialogic notion of stance is philosophically anchored in the bakhtinian perspective of discourse, according to which subjectivity is set up as an act of self’s response towards otherness.

4. From the very beginning, argumentative semantics (cf. Anscombe & Ducrot, 1983; Anscombe, 1995; Carel & Ducrot, 2005; Carel, 2011; García
Negroni, 2017, 2018, among others) has claimed that meaning should be described in terms of argumentative chains and not in terms of reference to reality or to previous cognitive categories. Initially conceived as a sequence ‘Argument-Conclusion’ connected by means of the prototypical conclusive connector therefore, the notion of argumentative chain has been redefined in terms of semantic interdependence between the two segments of the chain (Carel & Ducrot, 2005; Carel, 2011). This semantic interdependence can be expressed not only in terms of a conclusive or normative argumentation (i.e., A therefore B), but also in terms of a transgressive relation (i.e., A however Neg. B) by means of the prototypical concessive connector however.

5. In Ducrot’s theory of polyphony (1984), the enunciator (Fr. énonciateur) is the discursive character to whom the origin of semantic content of the utterance is attributed.

6. In order to facilitate the interpretation of the DF evoked by the evidential PoVs referred to in the examples, I have resorted to a variable X as a simplifying form of the argumentative sequence embedded in its sense in each case.

7. Example (3) involves an excerpt taken from a famous speech delivered by J. Domingo Perón as soon as he returned to Argentina after being in exile for eighteen years. The day before his return, millions of people went to Ezeiza International Airport to offer him a warm welcome. Yet, the event ended up in a very serious armed clash between Peronist union activists and the revolutionary Peronist youth movement (Montoneros). Slogans such as Perón, Evita, glory to the socialist people! and Here is the youth movement. Perón again, or rather dead to which the youth movement adhered are precisely the ones dialogically evoked by the DF which gives rise to (3).

8. According to Verón (1987), as opposed to other discourse types, political discourse intrinsically implies the simultaneous construction of a positive addressee and a negative one. Verón adds that in contemporary democratic systems there is a third type of addressee that is to be persuaded. This figure is the ‘indecisive addressee’. For a further characterisation of the different types of negative addressees (veiled, indirect, direct, third-person negative addressees) in political discourse, refer to García Negroni, 1988 & 2016.

9. Let us consider that in terms of argumentative semantics (Carel & Ducrot, 2005), converse argumentation keeps the two segments of the sequence together, but it alters the connector and the negation type. Therefore, for example, the converse sequences X THF Y and X THF Neg. Y involve X HW Neg. Y and X HW Y respectively.
10. It should be noted that the negative utterance *not because we are better* cannot be analyzed as a polemic negation. In the first place, because it is followed by a rectification utterance introduced by *but*, characteristic of metalinguistic/metadiscursive negation. In the second place, because the positive position (i.e., *we are better*) to which the locutor L opposes is not internal to the discourse in which it is questioned. As shown in paraphrase (8a), the utterance involves a plausible discourse attributed to other locutor(s) in the enunciative scene. Hence the metadiscursive value of the negation at stake is confirmed.

11. In order to provide an example of this type of negative expression with a polemic *subjunctive* (RAE, 2009) in Spanish, we should consider the following excerpt taken from C. Kirchner’s speech on 3/12/2016: ‘*No es que esté descreyendo* –en absoluto– de los partidos políticos y de las organizaciones partidarias, nada más alejado de mí, soy profundamente democrática, pero entiendo que no es suficiente’. *This doesn't mean I don’t trust in political parties. I’m far from that idea. On the contrary. I deeply advocate democracy, though I understand it is not enough.* According to RAE (2009, p. 1945), this polemic *subjunctive* (i.e. ‘*No es que esté descreyendo*’, *This doesn’t mean I don’t trust*) appears to contradict or reject a previous affirmation.

12. In García Negroni (2019), I deal with alluding PoVs. Strongly connected to what Authier-Revuz (1984, 1992, 2020) refers to as marked or unmarked forms of heterogeneity, these PoVs involve saying forms in which something said in previous events is alluded, transformed or framed. In fact, as they do not involve the explicit object of the act of enunciation but imply alluded sense, these PoVs are likely to be overlooked. However, and in line with Authier, if they are identified by the interpreter they act as a memory of previous discourses and they enable the interpreter to have access to them.

References


and the expression of surprise, *Pragmatics*, https://doi.org/10.1075/prag.20015.gar


